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HEALTH CARE LAW
Kathleen M. McCauley *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the state of health care law in Virginia. It
is not intended to be a primer on regulatory or corporate health
care law, and therefore, is in no way comprehensive in nature.
Rather, it is a survey of the more newsworthy areas of the law
that impact medical professionals, patients, and the attorneys
who represent both groups. With increasing media and govern-
ment attention, the laws that govern the medical profession and
health care litigation in general are evolving. On the verge of an-
other medical malpractice insurance crisis, this article examines
the status of, and recent changes to, the body of law that controls
Virginia's professionals and the delivery of health care services to
the Commonwealth at large.
II. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
Virginia, like other states, found itself in the midst of a medical
malpractice crisis in the mid-1970s when medical professional li-
ability insurance carriers drastically increased premiums for cov-
erage. The crisis prompted the General Assembly of Virginia to
find a way to contain costs and protect physicians from increasing
premiums. The General Assembly ordered a study of the issue,'
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which resulted in the passage of the Medical Malpractice Act
("Malpractice Act").2 The Malpractice Act created a pretrial
screening tool,3 and a cap on damage recoveries.4 It further pro-
vided for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia to
promulgate rules of practice under the statute.5 These rules are
not part of the Malpractice Act, but are found at the back of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.6 The Malpractice Act
changed the way civil litigators approached medical negligence
cases, as the statutes of the Malpractice Act and the related
Rules of Practice control the manner in which this special cate-
gory of tort actions is prepared for trial and ultimately tried to a
jury in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
A. Medical Malpractice Review Panels
The Medical Malpractice Rules of Practice ("Rules") permit any
party to a malpractice case to request a Medical Malpractice Re-
view Panel ("Panel") after civil litigation against a health care
provider has been instituted.7 The party must request the Panel
within thirty days of the date the defendant(s) filed responsive
pleadings.' Historically, defendants requested Panels more fre-
quently than plaintiffs, as physicians wanted the benefit of case
review by a jury of their "peers."
In accordance with Medical Malpractice Rule 2(b), a Panel re-
quest must include the names, addresses, and telephone numbers
of the parties and their respective counsel.9 The request must in-
clude a certification-similar to that included with a legal plead-
ing-that the request has been mailed to all other parties and
their attorneys, if their identities are known.' With the request,
counsel for the requesting party is required to send copies of the
Motion for Judgment and all responsive pleadings to the clerk of
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 to -581.20 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
3. See id. § 8.01-581.2 (Cune. Supp. 2003) (allowing for either party to request a
panel within thirty days from the filing of the responsive pleading).
4. Id. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
5. Id. § 8.01-581.11 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
6. VA. MED. MAL. R. 1-7.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
8. Id.; VA. MED. MAL. R. 2(a).
9. VA. MED. MAL. R. 2(b).
10. VA. MED. MAL. R. 2(b)(6).
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the supreme court.1' A copy of the request is also sent to the clerk
of the circuit court where the matter is pending. 2
Once the request is received, the Supreme Court of Virginia se-
lects four members from a list of attorneys and physicians com-
piled by the Virginia State Bar and the Virginia Board of Medi-
cine to serve on the Panel. 3 The judge from the circuit court
where the underlying action is pending presides over the Panel.'4
In appointing members of the Panel, the supreme court endeav-
ors to appoint health care professionals who practice in the same
specialty of medicine as the defendant."
Once a Panel is designated, either party may request an ore te-
nus hearing before the Panel." The request must be made in
writing within ten days of the designation of the Panel mem-
bers. 7 Also within that time limitation, the circuit court judge
presiding over the Panel will advise the parties of the discovery
cut-off date." This date should not exceed 120 days from the date
the Panel was originally requested. 9 Standard pretrial discovery
is accepted and may be used later at the trial in circuit court.2"
The judge presiding over the Panel holds the same authority as
he or she would in Virginia's circuit courts. The judge may ad-
minister the oath,2' rule on the admissibility of evidence,22 advise
the Panel on legal issues,23 issue subpoenas,24 and prepare the
11. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
12. Id.
13. Id. §§ 8.01-581.2(A), -581.3 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2003). Specifically, the
court appoints two "impartial" attorneys and two "impartial" health care providers who
are actively practicing their professions in the Commonwealth. Id. § 8.01-581.3(i) (Repl.
Vol, 2000). The supreme court appoints the panel members from a pool of 240 attorneys
and 915 health care professionals, which have been provided by the Virginia Board of
Medicine and the Virginia State Bar, respectively. VA. MED. MAL. R. 3(c)-(d).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.3(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2000). The judge has no vote and does
not take part in the Panel's deliberations. Id.
15. Id. § 8.01-581.3 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
16. Id. § 8.01-581.5 (Repl. Vol. 2000); VA. MED. MAL. R. 5.
17. VA. MED. MAL. R. 5.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2000); VA. Med. Mal. R. 4(d).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
20. See id. § 8.01-581.4 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
21. See id. § 8.01-581.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
22. Id. § 8.01-581.4 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
23. Id.
24. See id. § 8.01-581.6(3) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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Panel's opinion." Evidence is submitted to the Panel members
and the judge prior to or in lieu of an ore tenus hearing.2 6 The
submission includes a statement of facts and all documentary
evidence the party plans to introduce to the Panel.17 The plain-
tiffs submission is due no later than ten days after the discovery
cut-off.2" Similarly, the defendant's submission is due no later
than ten days after receiving the plaintiffs submission.29 In
reaching its decision, the Panel may consider the parties' written
submissions," and, in the case of an ore tenus hearing, live testi-
mony of fact and expert witnesses.31
In the cases where an ore tenus hearing has been requested
and scheduled, the hearing is conducted like a "mini-trial." The
parties offer the testimony of witnesses under oath, 2 present
relevant evidence, and conduct cross-examination. A party is
not, however, compelled to appear in order for the Panel to reach
a decision.34 In the absence of a hearing, the Panel will convene in
executive session to review the submissions, deliberate, and reach
a decision.35 The parties are given notice of the date, time, and
place for the executive session. 6
The Panel must render an opinion within thirty days of receiv-
ing all the parties' submissions.37 The Panel may make one of the
following decisions: (1) the defendant did not breach the standard
of care; (2) the defendant breached the standard of care and the
breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs alleged dam-
ages; (3) the defendant breached the standard of care but did not
cause the alleged damages; or (4) there is a material fact, not re-
25. Id. § 8.01-581.4 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
26. VA. MED. MAL. R. 4(e).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. VA. MED. MAL. R. 4(f).
30. Evidence may include medical records, radiology studies, lab studies, excerpts
from medical literature, and depositions of witnesses. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.4
(Repl. Vol. 2000).
31. See id. § 8.01-581.6(2) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
32. Id. § 8.01-581.6(1) (Repl. Vol. 2000); VA. MED. MAL. R. 6(j)(4).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.6(2) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
34. Id.
35. VA. MED. MAL. R. 5.
36. Id.
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000); VA, MED. MAL. R. 6(j)(13).
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quiring expert testimony but related to liability, which should be
considered by a judge or jury.38
The decision must be reached by a majority of the Panel. The
opinion must be in writing and any member of the Panel may
note his dissent. 9 It must then be mailed to the parties within
five days of the decision and may be announced in the presence of
the parties at the ore tenus hearing.4 °
The Panel opinion is admissible at trial, but is not conclusive or
binding on the trier of fact.41 Furthermore, any party may call a
Panel member (excluding the judge) as a trial witness.42 The
Panel enjoys immunity from civil liability for opinions or conclu-
sions reached in the course of and within the scope of its duties.43
All documentary evidence, a transcript of the ore tenus hearing, if
applicable, and a copy of the Panel's decision are filed with the
clerk of the circuit court.44 The materials remain part of the court
file until completion of the legal action and are included with the
case record.45
Medical Malpractice Review Panels are being requested less
frequently than they have been in the past. Most parties now rec-
ognize that the Panel process adds delay and expense to the un-
derlying action. Health care defendants are beginning to appreci-
ate that a favorable outcome from the Panel is no guarantee that
the case will be dismissed by the plaintiff, disposed of after dis-
covery, or won by the defense at trial. In fact, when the defendant
requests the Panel, most plaintiffs opt out of the process and ob-
serve from a distance. This decision provides the plaintiff access
to "free" discovery and some insight into the defense strategy
prior to trial. This strategy, in the end, places the defendant at a
disadvantage not contemplated by the General Assembly when
the Malpractice Act was first instituted.
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.7(A)(1)-(4) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
39. Id. § 8.01-581.7(C) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 8.01-581.8 (Repl. Vol. 2000), See also Raines v. Lutz, 231 Va. 110, 115-16,
341 S.E.2d 194, 197 (1986) (holding that the opinion of the review panel was not binding
upon the trier of fact, but may be considered with other evidence).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.8 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 8.01-581.4:1 (Repl. Vol. 2000); VA. MED. MAL. R. 6(d).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.4:1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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B. Medical Malpractice Damages Limited by Statute
From its inception, the Malpractice Act has limited recovery for
damages associated with medical malpractice litigation.46 The cap
only applies to an alleged act of medical negligence against a
"health care provider," as defined in Virginia Code section 8.01-
581.1.4" The total amount recoverable includes both prejudgment
interest4" and punitive damages.49 A plaintiff may seek to recover
any amount, but the judge must reduce a jury's verdict to comply
with the statutory limit.5 °
In 1999 the General Assembly raised the cap to $1,500,000."' It
will increase annually every July 1 by $50,000,2 and in 2007 and
2008 it will increase by $75,000 each year to reach $2,000,000."3
The final increase will occur on July 1, 2008."4 The constitutional-
ity of this limit has been an issue since the enactment of the Mal-
practice Act. Most recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld
the constitutionality of the cap in Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency
Services.5 Specifically, the supreme court ruled that the statutory
cap does not violate the right to trial by jury, 6 prohibitions
against special legislation," the Fifth Amendment's takings
clause,58 or the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.5 9 It is
anticipated that the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association will re-
sume its lobby to increase the limitation on recovery or abolish
the malpractice cap altogether in the 2009 legislative session.60
46. See id. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
47. Id.; see id. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003) (defining health care provider).
48. VIRGINIA CLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN VIRGINIA § 2.403, at 47 (Malcolm P.
McConnell III ed., 2002).
49. Id. § 2.402, at 46-47.
50. Id. § 2.401, at 46.
51. Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 711, 1999 Va. Acts 1190 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999).
56. Id. at 15, 509 S.E.2d at 315.
57. Id. at 19, 509 S.E.2d at 315.
58. Id. at 20, 509 S.E.2d at 318.
59. Id. at 21, 509 S.E.2d at 318.
60. For further discussion on statutory limitations on medical malpractice awards, see
Michael L. Goodman et al., Damages for Medical Malpractice in Virginia, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 919 (1999) and VIRGINIA CLE, supra note 48, at 46-47.
[Vol. 38:137
HEALTH CARE
C. Standard of Care
In 2003 the General Assembly amended the statute that con-
trols how claimants prove the applicable standard of care and any
breach of that standard in any proceeding before a medical mal-
practice review panel or an action for civil damages.6' House Bill
1906 amended the statute to limit the number of experts permit-
ted to testify in any action.62 Specifically, the statute limits each
party to no more than two medical experts from any medical spe-
cialty on any issue presented.63 It does not limit the number of
treating health care providers who may be called to testify as ex-
perts in accordance with Virginia Code section 8.01-399.64
III. VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY
COMPENSATION ACT
In response to the burgeoning cost of malpractice insurance
coverage, the General Assembly enacted the Virginia Birth-
Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act ("Act") in 1987.65
The Act established the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological In-
jury Compensation Program ("Program"),6 which has been
fraught with criticism in recent years. As a result, it garnered the
attention of the General Assembly in 2003.
During this legislative session, House Bill 2048 was introduced
to address some of the provisions of the Act that have come under
fire.6 7 The legislation amends the definition of "birth-related neu-
61. The standard of care is defined as "that degree of skill and diligence practiced by a
reasonably prudent practitioner in the field of practice or specialty in this Commonwealth
and the testimony of an expert witness." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20(A) (Cum. Supp.
2003).
62. H.B. 1906, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2003) (enacted as Act of Mar. 16, 2003,
ch. 251, 2003 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20(C) (Cum.
Supp. 2003))).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Act of Mar. 27, 1987, ch. 540, 1987 Va. Acts 830 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Supp. 2003)).
66. Id.
67. H.B. 2048, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2003) (enacted as Act of Mar. 22, 2003,
ch. 897, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3701, -3705
(Cum. Supp. 2003); id. §§ 38.2-5001, -5002, -5004, -5004.1, -5005, -5007, -5008, -5009,
-5015, and -5016 (Supp. 2003); codified at id. §§ 38.2-5002.1, -5002.2, -5009.1, and -5016.1
(Supp. 2003))).
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rological injury" to include an injury "occurring in the course of
labor, delivery or resuscitation necessitated by a deprivation of
oxygen or mechanical injury that occurred in the course of labor
or delivery.... "68 The Act, as amended, further authorizes the
Worker's Compensation Commission to award up to $100,000 to
the parents or legal guardian of an infant who meets the criteria
of the program and dies within 180 days of birth.69 The Office of
the Attorney General is required to provide legal services for the
Program.7 ° Other changes to the Act include: (1) a requirement
that the Board of Health Professions or Department of Health in-
vestigate health care providers and participating hospitals if the
conduct rises to the level of disciplinary action;71 (2) a require-
ment that hospitals release fetal heart monitoring strips to the
Program or the claimant;72 and (3) a requirement that the report
of the reviewing panel of physicians be mailed to all parties and
the Program within sixty days after filing of the petition with the
Worker's Compensation Commission.73
With regard to the obligations of participating physicians and
hospitals, the amended Act now requires physicians and mid-
wives to inform their patients, in writing, as to whether they par-
ticipate in the Program.7 ' The Act also requires hospitals to pro-
vide a brochure on the Program to all parents of infants admitted
to the neonatal intensive care unit.7" The exclusive remedy provi-
sions remain, although the General Assembly clarified the scope
of the statute. The mother of the injured infant is not subject to
the Program's exclusivity provision regarding her own physical
injuries sustained during the birthing process; however, the pro-
vision applies to claims by an infant's parents or representative if
the claim is derivative of the medical malpractice claim for the in-
fant's injuries.76
68. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Supp. 2003)).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009.1 (Supp. 2003).
70. Id. § 38.2-5002.1(A) (Supp. 2003).
71. Id. § 38.2-5004(B)-(C) (Supp. 2003).
72. Id. § 38.2-5004(E)-(F) (Supp. 2003). Failure to provide the fetal heart monitor
strips creates a rebuttal presumption of fetal distress. Id. § 38.2-5008(A)(1)(b) (Supp.
2003).
73. Id. § 38.2-5008(C) (Supp. 2003).
74. Id. § 38.2-5004.1(A) (Supp. 2003).
75. Id. § 38.2-5004.1(B) (Supp. 2003).
76. Id. § 38.2-5002(B) (Supp. 2003).
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With patient privacy also in the spotlight, the General Assem-
bly enacted a statute to maintain as confidential certain records
of the Program. Those records include: (1) records subject to the
attorney-client privilege; (2) medical and mental records of claim-
ants; (3) records relative to deliberations of the board of directors
of the Program; (4) reports of expert witnesses; and (5) all records
required to be maintained as confidential by federal law.77
Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia laid to rest the contro-
versy as to whether the April 1, 2000 amendments to the Act
were intended to be retroactive. In Berner v. Mills,7" the court
held that the emergency legislation amending the statutory defi-
nition of "participating physician" was effective as of the date it
was passed-the amendment was not retroactive.79
The Program came under fire by the General Assembly, the lo-
cal media, and some of Virginia's health care law experts."0 It is
anticipated that the 2004 legislative session will include discus-
sions about reorganizing or abolishing the Program in its en-
tirety.
IV. EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ACTIVE LABOR ACT
The federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act ("EMTALA")1 applies to any hospital that has an emergency
room.8 2 The statute provides that the hospital is liable for failure
to treat any patient who arrives at the facility in an emergent
condition. EMTALA causes of action arising in Virginia are gov-
erned by the federal procedures provided in EMTALA rather than
the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act. 4
77. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 897, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
5002.2 (Supp. 2003)).
78. 265 Va. 408, 579 S.E.2d 159 (2003).
79. Id. at 414-15, 579 S.E.2d at 162.
80. See generally K. Marshall Cook, The Virginia Birth Injury Program: Challenges of
Adolescence, VA. HEALTH LAW., (Va. State Bar, Richmond, Va.) June 2003, at 10, available
at http'//www.vsb.org/sections/hl/index.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
82. Id. § 1395dd(a) (2000).
83. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1) (2000).
84. VIRGINIA CLE, supra note 48, § 2.1.
20031
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While EMTALA is a remedial statute designed to prevent dis-
crimination against those patients who are unable to pay for
treatment or who are covered under Medicare or Medicaid, the
statute reaches more broadly than its intended purpose.
EMTALA imposes affirmative obligations on health care provid-
ers that go beyond non-discrimination. Section 1395dd(d)(1)(C),
by its very terms, applies to physicians as well as hospitals."s This
section of the Act imposes a penalty on the physician who fails to
respond to a patient's emergency medical condition when he or
she is the physician on-call."6 An "emergency medical condition" is
defined as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of suf-
ficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of im-
mediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result
in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a
pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child)
in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having contrac-
tions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to an-
other hospital before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of
the woman or the unborn child.s7
Not providing treatment to someone who presents any of these
symptoms subjects an individual physician "to a civil money pen-
alty of not more than $50,000. " "s Likewise, hospitals may be "sub-
ject to a civil money penalty of not more than $50,000 (or not
more than $25,000 in the case of a hospital with less than 100
beds)." 9 In essence, the provisions of EMTALA impose equal li-
ability on both the health care employees of the hospital and the
institution itself. Accordingly, some courts have allowed hospitals
to make a claim for contribution or indemnity against the indi-
vidual health care provider who makes a decision against which
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(C) (2000).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1) (2000).
88. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (2000).
89. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A) (2000).
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an EMTALA claim is made.9" There have been no such decisions
in the courts of Virginia to date. Of course, the individual provid-
ers most likely to encounter such difficult EMTALA decisions are
those employed in hospital emergency rooms.
EMTALA allows plaintiffs to seek recovery for personal harm
to the patient 91 or for financial losses to the receiving medical fa-
cility.92 The statute of limitations for recovery under EMTALA is
two years from the date of the violation.93
The Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the provi-
sions of EMTALA in Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.94 The Su-
preme Court rejected the position of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit," which held that in order to prevail
on an EMTALA claim, the claimant must show that the hospital
acted with an improper motive.96 That is, that the violation re-
sulted from discrimination based on the patient's race, sex, ethnic
group, disease, occupation, or political or cultural affiliation.9
The Supreme Court's opinion, while not detailed, states that pa-
tients who allege that they have been improperly treated in viola-
tion of EMTALA need not show that the hospital acted with an
improper motive.9" In sum, the opinion suggests that liability un-
der EMTALA need not be based on an improper transfer due to
financial considerations, but rather that the patient was not
properly stabilized in accordance with the provisions of the Act,
irrespective of any improper motive.99 The effect of this ruling, it
seems, is that an EMTALA claim sounds in simple negligence
rather than for violations born out of discrimination.
90. See, e.g., McDougal v. LaFourche Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 3, No. 92-2006, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7381, at *3-4 (E.D. La. May 25, 1993) (unpublished decision) (holding that a
hospital may assert its state law claim against a doctor at fault).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (2000).
92. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B) (2000).
93. Id. § 1392dd(d)(2)(C) (2000).
94. 525 U.S. 249 (1999) (per curiam).
95. Id. at 252.
96. Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 111 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 1997).
97. Roberts, 525 U.S. at 252 (noting that the Sixth Circuit's position was contrary to
the law of other circuits who have addressed the motive issue); see also Cleland v. Bronson
Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that EMTALA section
1395dd(a) contains an improper motive requirement).
98. See Roberts, 525 U.S. at 253.
99. Id.
20031
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It will be interesting to see whether the Roberts opinion neu-
tralizes the effect of EMTALA and results in no more than a state
court action for medical malpractice. As with most issues in
health care, the laws that affect and govern the profession are
constantly evolving. Time will be the best determinant as to the
true impact of EMTALA on the individual practitioner.
V. THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
The media and legislative spotlights have been on the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") since the
Clinton Administration. At one time known as the Kassebaum-
Kennedy Law, Congress passed HIPAA in 1996.1"' The primary
purpose of HIPAA was to improve the continuity and portability
of health care while preserving the privacy of certain health in-
formation.1 ' Additionally, the Act seeks "to combat waste, fraud,
and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery... [and]
to simplify the administration of health insurance .... "102 In an
effort to carry out these purposes in the information age, HIPAA
targets three areas of the health care industry: (1) insurance
portability;0 3 (2) fraud enforcement;0 4 and (3) administrative
simplification.' 5 Patient privacy is the focus of HIPAA's adminis-
trative simplification section. 10
6
These privacy regulations ("Privacy Rule") are designed to
maintain the privacy of certain protected health information
("PHI") of patients. The final Privacy Rule was published in De-
cember 2000, to be effective in April 2001.107 The Privacy Rule
applies to certain covered entities, including the following: (1)
100. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the United States Code).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. §§ 101-02, 110 Stat. at 1939-55.
104. Id. §§ 200-50, 110 Stat. at 1991-2021.
105. Id. §§ 261-64, 110 Stat. at 2021-34. For a more comprehensive discussion of the
administrative simplification process, see Elizabeth Guilbert Perrow & Thomas W. Farrell,
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: An Overview of Administrative
Simplification, XIV J. CIv. L. 231 (2002).
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to -1320d-8 (2000).
107. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
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health plans; (2) health care clearinghouses; and (3) health care
providers who transmit health information in electronic form re-
lated to a transaction covered by the federal regulations.10 8 Final
modifications to the Privacy Rule were published in August
2002, ' 09 and covered entities were required to comply with the
Privacy Rule by April 14, 2003.1'0
HIPAA's Privacy Rule protects "individually identifiable health
information," whether oral or written, that is maintained or
transmitted by a covered entity."1 "Individually identifiable
health information" includes "demographic information collected
from an individual [patient]. '"12 It further includes any informa-
tion "created or received by a health care provider, health plan,
employer, or health care clearinghouse ... [that] [rielates to the
past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of
an individual."11 3 It also relates to information regarding "the
past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care
to an individual," if the information identifies the individual pa-
tient.1
14
The Privacy Rule does not prohibit disclosure of PHI; rather, it
requires that the information be disclosed only in accordance
with HIPAA.115 The Privacy Rule requires that when a covered
entity discloses PHI or when it is requesting protected informa-
tion from another covered entity, it must make reasonable efforts
to limit PHI to the minimum disclosure necessary to meet the re-
quirements of the request.' 6 That being said, this requirement
does not apply to the release of PHI in the following situations:
(1) requests from or disclosure to a health care provider for the
purpose of medical treatment; (2) release of PHI to the patient
himself; (3) disclosure of PHI to the Department of Health and
Human Services; (4) disclosures or requests required by law; or
108. 45 C.F.R. § 164.104 (2001).
109. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed.
Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
110. 45 C.F.R. § 164.534 (2002). Small health plans must comply by April 14, 2004. Id.
111. Id. § 164.501 (2002).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 164.502(a) (2002).
116. Id. § 164.502(b)(1) (2002).
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(5) release of, or request for,-information in accordance with the
Privacy Rule.'17
Individuals are granted certain rights to their PHI under
HIPAA's Privacy Rule. These rights include the following: (1) to
request that certain restrictions be placed on the disclosure of
their PHI;L1 (2) to review and copy their PHI;"9 (3) to amend
their PHI;1 20 (4) to receive a copy of the notice from the covered
entity;12' and (5) to receive an accounting of disclosures of PHI. 22
Despite the patient's rights under HIPAA, PHI-as contained in
the medical records-remains the property of the health care
provider.
23
The Privacy Rule requires that a covered entity not disclose or
use PHI without authorization, unless the disclosure is contem-
plated by the regulations. 24 For an authorization to be valid un-
der HIPAA, it must include the following information: (1) a de-
scription of the information to be disclosed; (2) "identification of
the person(s), or class of persons, authorized" to use or disclose
the PHI; (3) identification of the person(s), or class of persons, to
whom disclosure may be made; (4) a description of the purpose of
the use of disclosure; (5) an expiration date or event; (6) the indi-
vidual's signature and date; and (7) a description of the authority
of the signator to act on behalf of the individual, if signed by a
personal representative. 125 The authorization must also notify the
patient of his or her rights by including: (1) a statement that the
individual may revoke authorization and instructions regarding
how to do so, and (2) a statement that medical treatment, pay-
ment, enrollment in a plan, or eligibility for benefits may not be
predicated on obtaining the authorization from the individual if
such a condition is prohibited by the Privacy Rule.'26 To the de-
gree it is not prohibited, the authorization must also include: (1) a
statement about the consequences of not authorizing use and/or
117. Id. § 164.502(b)(2) (2002).
118. Id. § 164.522(a)(1) (2002).
119. Id. § 164.524(a)(1) (2002).
120. Id. § 164.526(a)(1) (2002).
121. Id. § 164.520(a)(1) (2002).
122. Id. § 164.528(a)(1) (2002).
123. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.3 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
124. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a) (2002).
125. Id. § 164.508(c)(1) (2002).
126. Id. § 164.508(c)(2)(i)-(ii)(A) (2002).
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disclosure, 27 and (2) a statement about the likelihood that the
PHI will be disclosed by the recipient. 2 '
Authorization is not required for disclosure in accordance with
the following: (1) public health activities;129 (2) reporting victims
of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence;131 (3) health oversight ac-
tivities;131 (4) judicial and administrative proceedings; 132 or (5) law
enforcement purposes (i.e., pursuant to court order or sub-
poena). 33
It is important to note that any provision of the HIPAA Privacy
Rule that is contrary to Virginia law preempts that provision of
state law. 3 4 That being said, federal law will not preempt state
law if the state law is promulgated as necessary to: (1) "prevent
fraud and abuse related to the provision of or payment for [medi-
cal services]"; (2) ensure state regulation of the insurance indus-
try and health care plans; (3) report on the delivery of health care
and related costs; or (4) "serv[e] a compelling need related to pub-
lic health, safety, or welfare."13' The general rule also does not
apply if the state law's principal purpose is to regulate controlled
substances. 36 Furthermore, HIPAA will not preempt a state law
if the state law is more stringent than the federal statute.'37
VI. MEDICAL RECORDS AND PATIENT PRIVACY IN VIRGINIA
A. The Virginia Patient Privacy Act
The Virginia Patient Privacy Act ("Patient Privacy Act") con-
trols the release of private health information in Virginia. 3 Dur-
127. Id. § 164.508(c)(2)(ii)(B) (2002).
128. Id. § 164.508(c)(2)(iii) (2002).
129. Id. § 164.512(b) (2002).
130. Id. § 164.512(c) (2002).
131. Id. § 164.512(d) (2002).
132. Id. § 164.512(e) (2002).
133. Id. § 164.512(f) (2002).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1) (2000). "Contrary to state law" is defined as impossible
to comport with both state and federal law or that the state law is a major obstacle to the
implementation of the Privacy Rule. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2002).
135. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(a)(1)(i)-(iv) (2002).
136. Id. § 160.203(a)(2) (2002).
137. Id. § 160.203(b) (2002).
138. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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ing the 2002 legislative session, the General Assembly made an-
ticipatory amendments to several state statues in order to be
HIPAA compliant.139 Like the Privacy Rule, the Patient Privacy
Act has many exceptions to the general rule against disclosure. 4 °
In instances where the Virginia rule is more strict than HIPAA,
the state statute will control the use and disclosure of PHI in Vir-
ginia. 141
In 2003, the legislature revised the subpoena provisions of the
Patient Privacy Act to comport with federal regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the Privacy Rule of HIPPA.14 1 Specifically, the
amendment addresses the return date of a subpoena duces tecum
for medical records and the notice requirements .14' No subpoena
return date shall be less than fifteen days unless by court order
or at the direction of an administrative agency for good cause."4
A motion to quash must be filed within fifteen days of the notice
to the patient or the medical provider. 45 The notice to the pro-
vider must include language that the patient or his counsel had
received a copy of the subpoena, that the patient or his counsel
has a right to file a motion to quash, and that the provider must
not comply with the subpoena until he receives notice that no mo-
tion to quash has been filed.146
Upon receiving notice that the patient or his counsel has filed a
motion to quash, the provider must send the records to the court
or administrative agency under seal with a cover letter stating
that confidential medical records are enclosed and are to be held
pending a hearing and ruling by the court.147 The revised statute
further requires that if no motion to quash is filed within fifteen
139. Act of Apr. 17, 2002, ch. 835, 2002 Va. Acts 2044 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-127.1:03, -127-1:04 (Cum. Supp. 2003) (relating to sharing of protected
health information between state agencies)); Act of Apr. 6, 2002, ch. 568, 2002 Va. Acts
757 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-116.1, -127.1:03 (Cum. Supp. 2003)
(allowing the release of patient care reports for victims of crimes)).
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(D)(1)-(27) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
141. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2002).
142. Act of Mar. 31, 2003, ch. 907, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2003)). For additional discussion of this change,
see James R. Kibler, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Administrative Law, 38 U. RICH.
L. REV. 39, 47 (2003).
143. Id.
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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days of the date of the request for records, the party issuing the
subpoena has the duty to certify148 to the subpoenaed provider
that no motion has been filed and it is appropriate to comply with
the request.'49 The medical records requested shall be produced
by the original return date or fifteen days after receipt of the cer-
tification, whichever is later. 5 °
The Patient Privacy Act was further amended to address juve-
nile medical records and release of such information in the face of
federal privacy protection.'5 ' House Bill 2155 amends the Patient
Privacy Act to include section 16.1-248.3.52 The statute provides
for disclosure of otherwise protected medical information to a se-
cure facility (i.e., a juvenile detention facility) directly from a
health care provider if consent from the parent or guardian is re-
fused or not readily available.'53 The records may be obtained
only if they are necessary: (1) for the provision of medical care
and treatment to the juvenile; (2) to protect the health and safety
of the juvenile; or (3) to maintain the security and safety of the
facility. 1
1
B. Treating Health Care Providers
Virginia also has a unique statute that limits interaction with
an individual's treating physician without the express permission
of the patient. Virginia Code section 8.01-399 controls communi-
cations between physicians and patients. 5 5 Specifically, the stat-
ute mandates that no licensed practitioner of any branch of the
healing arts may be compelled to testify in any civil action re-
148. "Certification" is defined as "a written representation that is delivered by hand, by
first-class mail, by overnight delivery service, or by facsimile if the sender obtains a fac-
simile-machine-generated confirmation reflecting that all facsimile pages were success-
fully transmitted. Act of Mar. 31, 2003, ch. 907, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
149. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(5) (Cum. Supp.
2003)).
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(H)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
151. H.B. 2155, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2003) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2003,
ch. 983, 2003 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03 (Cum.
Supp. 2003); codified at id. § 16.1-248.3 (Cum. Supp. 2003))).
152. Id.
153. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-248.3 (Cum. Supp. 2003); id. § 32.1-127.1:03(C)(3) (Cum.
Supp. 2003).
154. Id. § 16.1-248.3 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
155. Id. § 8.01-399 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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garding information learned in the course of the physician-
patient relationship without the consent of the patient or as pro-
vided by the section.156 If the physical or mental condition of the
patient is at issue in a civil action, the diagnosis or treatment
plan of the practitioner as documented in the patient's medical
records shall be disclosed, but only in the course of discovery.5 7
"Only diagnos[es] offered to a reasonable degree of medical prob-
ability [will] be admissible at trial."158
The statute further prohibits a lawyer, or someone acting on
his behalf, from obtaining information "in connection with pend-
ing or threatened litigation ... from a practitioner ... without
the consent of the patient," unless it is done through the discov-
ery process.' 59 This section does not apply, however, to communi-
cations between an attorney who "represent[s] a practitioner of
the healing arts ... and that practitioner's employers, partners,
agents, servants, employees, co-employees or others for whom, at
law, the practitioner is or may be liable or who, at law, are or
may be liable for the practitioner's acts or omissions."160
VII. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS
The Virginia Department of Health Professions ("Department")
was established as an administrative department that is com-
prised of various health regulatory boards.'6 ' The Department in-
cludes the
Board of Health Professions... Board of Audiology and Speech-
Language Pathology, Board of Counseling, Board of Dentistry, Board
of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, Board of Medicine, Board of
Nursing, Board of Nursing Home Administrators, Board of Optome-
try, Board of Pharmacy, Board of Physical Therapy, Board of Psy-
chology, Board of Social Work and Board of Veterinary Medicine.
162
156. Id. § 8.01-399(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
157. Id. § 8.01-399(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 8.01-399(D) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
160. Id. § 8.01-399(D)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
161. Id. §§ 54.1-2501, -2503 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
162. Id. § 54.1-2503 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
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The Board of Health Professions consists of one member from
each health regulatory board and five members from the Com-
monwealth at large.163 All members are appointed by the Gover-
nor, confirmed by the General Assembly, and serve a four-year
term."64 The Board has multiple duties, which include the follow-
ing: (1) coordination of the health regulatory boards; (2) evalua-
tion of health care professions and occupations in Virginia; (3) re-
view and comment on the budget of the Department of Health
Professions; (4) providing the means of citizen access to the mem-
ber boards; (5) public education of Department activities; (6) re-
view and regulation of all disciplinary processes within the De-
partment; and (7) advising the Governor, the General Assembly,
and the Director of the Department on matters relating to the
regulation of its professionals. 65
The individual health regulatory boards have similar and com-
plimentary powers, which include the following: (1) establishing
the qualifications for registration, certification, or licensure of
their professional members;166 (2) registering, certifying, or licens-
ing applicants as practitioners of their particular profession; 67
and (3) establishing schedules for renewal of such registration,
certification, or licensure.' The boards also promulgate regula-
tions in accordance with the Administrative Process Act,169 which
is necessary and reasonable to administer the regulatory sys-
tem.170 The boards have the authority to revoke, suspend, restrict,
or refuse to issue or reissue a member's certification, registration,
or license,'171 and may take appropriate disciplinary action. 72 In
general, reports, information, or records received and compiled in
the course of a board investigation are confidential 1 3 and may not
163. Id. § 54.1-2507 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
164. Id. § 54.1-2400 (Supp. 2003).
165. Id. § 54.1-2510 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
166. Id. § 54.1-2400(1) (Supp. 2003).
167. Id. § 54.1-2400(3) (Supp. 2003).
168. Id. § 54.1-2400(4) (Supp. 2003).
169. Id. §§ 2.2-4000 to -4032 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
170. Id. § 54.1-2400(6) (Supp. 2003).
171. Id. § 54.1-2400(7) (Supp. 2003).
172. Id. § 54.1-2400(9) (Supp. 2003).
173. Id, § 54.1-2400.2(A) (Supp. 2003).
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be obtained by subpoena, through the discovery process, or intro-
duced into evidence in any medical malpractice action.
174
Lawsuits involving allegations of malpractice are often fol-
lowed by an inquiry by one of the regulatory boards. These in-
quiries usually are instituted in one of two ways. First, an indi-
vidual may file a complaint with the appropriate board (i.e.,
Board of Medicine, Board of Nursing, Board of Psychology, etc.),
which will then be investigated 175 and sometimes followed up by
either an informal conference 176 or a full formal conference.
177
Second, investigations by the Department may also be triggered
by a report to the National Practitioner Data Bank 7 relative to a
settlement or verdict in a medical malpractice case.179
In the wake of increased publicity regarding the licensing and
regulation of health professionals nationwide, a bill was intro-
duced during the 2003 legislative session to change the discipli-
nary procedures and burden of proof applicable to board proceed-
ings in Virginia.8 °  The General Assembly changed the
disciplinary standard for persons licensed by the Board of Medi-
cine from gross negligence to simple negligence.' 8' As amended,
the statute authorizes disciplinary action for "[iintentional or
negligent conduct in the practice of any branch of the healing arts
that causes or is likely to cause injury to a patient or patients."8 2
174. Id. § 54.1-2400.2(B) (Supp. 2003).
175. Id. § 54.1-2506.01 (Supp. 2003).
176. Id. § 2.2-4019 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
177. Id. § 2.2-4020 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
178. 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60.14 (2000). The National Practitioner Data Bank was estab-
lished in 1986 in an effort to provide information regarding the professional competence of
health care providers. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
§ 414, 100 Stat. 3784, 3787 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2000)). Medical malpractice in-
surers must report all payments resulting from insurance claims or judgments against
other health care providers. Id. § 421(a), 100 Stat. at 3788.
179. Inquiries are also instituted in accordance with a report generated in response to
the requirements of Virginia Code sections 54.1-2709.3, -2709.4, and -2906 to -2909, which
require individual boards and other health institutions to report disciplinary action to the
Department of Health Professions. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2506.01 (Supp. 2003).
180. H.B. 1441, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2003) (enacted as Act of Mar. 20, 2003,
ch. 762, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2915(A)(4) (Supp.
2003))). House Bill 1441 is identical to Senate Bill 1334.
181. Id. For a summary of the new rules, see Patrick C. Devine, Jr. & Karen W. Per-
rine, Virginia's New Rules for Health Care Practitioner Disciplinary Proceedings, VA.
HEALTH LAW. (Va. State Bar, Richmond, Va.) June 2003, at 2, available at http://www.vsb.
vipnet.org/sections/hl/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2915(A)(4) (Supp. 2003).
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The effect of the amendment is to blur the line between the ad-
ministrative process and the legal process.
By definition, medical malpractice involves negligent conduct
that causes injury to a patient.18 Accordingly, any act or omission
actionable under the Medical Malpractice Act" 4 could potentially
result in disciplinary action by the Board of Medicine."8 5 The
amendment could have devastating results on the profession in
Virginia, particularly in the face of another impending liability
insurance crisis.
In addition to changing the standard of review, the legislature
created a confidential consent agreement to be entered into in
lieu of disciplinary action in cases involving minor misconduct
where there is little to no injury to a patient or the public and
where likelihood of repetition of the misconduct by the practitio-
ner is slight.16 The consent order is not intended for cases of
demonstrated gross negligence, intentional misconduct, or in
cases where a practitioner has conducted his practice in a man-
ner that creates a danger to the health and welfare of his patients
or the public." 7 The General Assembly further clarified existing
reporting requirements by hospitals, health care institutions, and
health care professionals regarding disciplinary actions, medical
malpractice settlements and judgments, and certain disorders. 88
Civil penalties for failure to report are increased to a maximum of
$25,000 for acute care facilities and health care institutions and
$5,000 for others. 8 9
VIII. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JOINT UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION
The Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association 90
("JUA") was created due to concern that certain medical special-
183. See generally id. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003) (defining terms relevant to Medi-
cal Malpractice Review Panels).
184. Id. §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.20 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
185. Id. § 54.1-2915(A)(4) (Supp. 2003) (permitting the Board to refuse to issue a li-
cense, suspend a license, revoke a license, or censure or reprimand any person for negli-
gent conduct likely to injure a patient).
186. Act of Mar. 20, 2003, ch. 753, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2400(14) (Supp. 2003)).
187. Id.
188. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2400.3 (Supp. 2003)).
189. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-27 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
190. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-2800 to -2814 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Supp. 2003).
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ists would not be able to obtain professional liability coverage in
Virginia's voluntary market.19' In certain circumstances the JUA,
through activation by the State Corporation Commission ("SCC"),
provides medical malpractice insurance for new obstetricians in
Virginia who have trouble securing coverage.'92 The SCC has not
activated the JUA in this decade; however, some fear that the
need will arise in the near future in response to substantially in-
creasing professional liability insurance premiums.'93
In response to this fear, the legislature passed Senate Bill
1316, which amends Virginia Code section 38.2-2801 to require
the SCC to immediately begin an investigation of the voluntary
market for medical malpractice insurance in Virginia.'94 If after
investigation, the SCC determines that malpractice coverage
cannot be made "reasonably available" for a significant number of
health care providers, the SCC shall activate the JUA.'95 The
SCC's report of findings is due to the Governor and the chairmen
of the Commerce and Labor committees of the General Assembly
no later than December 31, 2003.196
Prior to the 2003 General Assembly Session, limits for medical
malpractice policies written by the JUA were not to exceed one
million dollars for each claimant under any one policy and three
million dollars in any one year.'97 The General Assembly in-
creased limits to two million dollars and six million dollars, re-
spectively, in keeping with the increase in the medical malprac-
tice cap.' Now that the JUA limits comport with the statutory
cap on damages, the JUA may be an effective remedy to the po-
tential insurance crisis facing Virginia health care professionals.
The next legislative session should shed some light on whether
the JUA will be implemented in the immediate future.
191. Id. § 38.2-2801(A) (Supp. 2003).
192. Id.
193. See Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 488, 2003 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-2801(E) (Supp. 2003) (increasing limits on medical malpractice insur-
ance policies issued by the JUA as "emergency legislation")).
194. S.B. 1316, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2003) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2003, ch.
1026, 2003 Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2801 (Supp. 2003))).
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2801(A) (Supp. 2003).
196. Act of Apr. 3, 2003, ch. 1026, 2003 Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-2801 (Supp. 2003)).
197. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2801(E) (Supp. 2003).
198. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 488, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-2801(E) (Supp. 2003)).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Health care is a progressive, controversial, and ever-changing
area of the law. These are turbulent times for Virginia's health
care industry and the professionals who practice here. There will
be more change in the future, with the fate of the Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Compensation Program and the Joint Un-
derwriting Association at the forefront of the agenda. Time will
tell us the effect of amendments to the Board of Medicine's stan-
dard for review, as well as the true nature of the liability insur-
ance crisis that looms inevitably over the horizon.

